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Abstract
The main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with simple trade
theory, the relationship between competing industrial standards and
trade liberalization. We assume that there are two competing indus-
trial standards in an international context, each of which consists of
di¤erentiated products. A product can be used only in combination
with other products based on the same industrial standard. We ex-
amine the impact of trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade costs)
on consumerschoice of a standard. It will be shown that the degree
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of indirect network e¤ects, captured with substitution between di¤er-
entiated products, plays an important role as a determinant of the
impact of trade liberalization.
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1 Introduction
Two of the most important trends in the global economy in recent decades
have been (1) the dramatic increase in the role of information-intensive prod-
ucts (e.g., various types of computer software products, consumer electronic
products and IT-related services), and (2) the proliferation of trade liberal-
ization through both economic integration and preferential trade agreements.
Trade liberalization and advances in digital technology have been associ-
ated with a growing connectivity among individuals and organizations and
a consequent increase in the ow of information-intensive products across
national boundaries. Stemming from these changes, competing proprietary,
incompatible standards have arisen throughout the world.1 In particular,
competition between a domesticstandard and a non-domesticstandard
is often observed. For example, Funk (1998) provides qualitative evidence
that in the global competition among wireless telecommunications service
providers, rms are likely to dominate domestically, thereby making the
homestandard dominant. That is, rms by and large have not succeeded
in marketing non-domesticstandards.2 Also, it is widely recognized that
1In this study, we will use the term standard,not in the sense of government regulation
but in the universal sense of the set of technical specications that enable compatibility
among products.
2Funk (1998) suggests that U.S. Motorolas share of the world market dropped from 40
in 1994 percent to 32 percent in 1995, as the installed base on European GSM standard
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products based on the same industrial standard exhibit an indirect network
e¤ect : the utility of consumers is increasing in the variety of complemen-
tary products based on a particular standard.3 There seems to be a case
for closer examination and more formal modeling of competing industrial
standards and their impact on trade and national welfare.
In the literature on trade and competing industrial standards, the role of
government standardization policy is often emphasized. In their inuential
contribution, Gandal and Shy (2001) analyzed governments incentives to
recognize foreign standards when there are potentially both network e¤ects
(i.e., consumption benets) and conversion costs. Their focus was on how
standardization policy a¤ects both international trade ows and national
welfare.
An important question about the relationship between competing indus-
trial standards and trade liberalization remains unanswered: How does trade
liberalization a¤ect consumerschoice between incompatible standards? The
grew: Motorola dominated in the U.S. while Nokia/Ericcson dominated in Europe. See,
also, Lembke (2002).
3The seminal contributions on the indirect network e¤ect are Chou and Shy (1990) and
Church and Gandal (1992). See Gandal (2001, 2002) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007)
for surveys of the relevant literature. In the international context, see Iwasa and Kikuchi
(2008) and Kikuchi (2005, 2007) for analyses of trade liberalization in the presence of
network e¤ects.
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main purpose of this study is to illustrate, with simple trade theory, this
relationship. Following Matsuyama (1992), we assume that there are two
incompatible standards, each of which consists of di¤erentiated products. A
product can be used only in combination with other products based on the
same industrial standard. Matsuyama assumed a closed economy and paid
scant attention to the role of trade liberalization. In contrast, in this study
we focus on the case of competing industrial standards in an international
context (i.e., a Home standard and a Foreign standard) and examine the
impact of trade liberalization (i.e., a decline in trade costs) on consumers
choice of a standard. Also, following Chou and Shy (1996), we emphasize
the role of consumersheterogeneous tastes for standards. We analyze the
e¤ects of changing the distribution of consumer tastes on the impact of trade
liberalization.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present
a basic model. The impact of trade liberalization is considered in Section 3,
followed by concluding remarks presented in Section 4.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two countries, Home and Foreign. We concentrate
on what happens in the Home market. Both Home rms and Foreign rms
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compete in the Home market, which is dened as a line of unit length rep-
resenting consumersset of preferences. Home consumers are indexed by z,
z 2 [0; 1], and with no loss of generality, we normalize the total mass of
Home consumers to equal 1. Each consumer is endowed with the amount E
of income to be spent on di¤erentiated products.
Assume that there are two competing industrial standards: Home stan-
dard and Foreign standard. A variety of di¤erentiated products can be pro-
duced based on either standard: we simply assume that Home (resp. Foreign)
rms produce products based on the Home (resp. Foreign) standard. The
two standards are not compatible with each other, hence any product can be
used only in combination with other products based on the same standard.4
A consumer is assumed to purchase products based on only one standard
(Home or Foreign). We call these groups of di¤erentiated products Home
standard products and Foreign standard products. We assume that the util-
ity of consumers is increasing in the variety of complementary products based
on a particular standard. We dene the utility of an individual type z by
U(z) = (1  z)C if he chooses Foreign standard products; and
U(z) = zC if he chooses Home standard products; (1)
where C (C) is the quantity index of Home (Foreign) standard products.
4See Matsuyama (1992) for this point.
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These indices are dened as the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) form
C =
"
nX
i=1
(ci)
( 1)=
#=( 1)
;
C =
"
nX
j=1
(cj)
( 1)=
#=( 1)
; (2)
where n (n) is the number of Home (resp. Foreign) standard products and
 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between every pair of products within
the same standard.
Following Chou and Shy (1996), we assume that the density function of
consumerstypes is given by,
f(z; ") =
1 + "
(1 + "z)2
; " >  1: (3)
When " = 0 the density function becomes a uniform density representing the
case in which consumers are evenly distributed on [0; 1]. Figure 1 shows that
when " increases, the distribution shifts towards the Foreign standard.
The importation of Foreign products is inhibited by frictional trade barri-
ers, which are modeled as iceberg costs a la Samuelson: for 1 unit of Foreign
product to reach Home, t 2 (1;1) units must be shipped. Thus, the price
of an imported product to Home consumers will be tp, where p is the pro-
ducers price for Foreign standard products. It is important to note that this
trade cost includes all impediments to trade such as tari¤s, but also communi-
cation di¢ culties, information barriers and cultural di¤erences. Price indices
7
for each group of standard products, which indicate costs for obtaining one
unit of quantity, are dened as follows:
P =
"
nX
i=1
(pi)
1 
#1=(1 )
= n1=(1 )p; (4)
P  =
"
nX
j=1
(tpj)
1 
#1=(1 )
= (n)1=(1 )p; (5)
where   t1  2 (0; 1) is the measure of the freeness of trade, which in-
creases as t falls and is equal to one when trade is costless (t = 1). Note
that n represents an e¤ective number of Foreign standard products: trade
liberalization (i.e., a larger ) can be interpreted as an increase in the number
of varieties even if n remains unchanged.
Now, let us turn to the cost structure of di¤erentiated products. Tech-
nology is assumed to be identical between countries and characterized by
increasing returns to scale, since product creation typically involves xed
costs. We denote the constant marginal cost of production for every product
by , and the product development cost by . We assume that rms are
monopolistic competitors. Given a Dixit-Stiglitz specication with constant
demand elasticity , each rm chooses its constant markup prices as
p = p =

   1 : (6)
Let us denote the number of consumers who purchase Home (resp, For-
eign) standard products as  (resp. ). Note that + = 1. Then, assuming
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that the entry and production decisions of the potential rms cannot individ-
ually a¤ect the existing rms, the equilibrium number of products produced
according to each standard becomes proportional to the total expenditure on
products based on each standard:
n =
(1  )E

; (7)
n =
E

: (8)
Combining (4), (5), (7), and (8), it can be easily shown that a consumers
welfare increases when more consumers purchase products with the same
standard. As more consumers choose the same standard, more rms choose
to produce based on that standard. This results in increased product diver-
sication among products with that standard.
Result 1: A consumers welfare is an increasing function of the number of
consumers who purchase products with the same standard.
This results in the types of indirect network e¤ectsanalyzed by both
Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992).
Now let us turn to the equilibrium number of consumers who purchase
Home/Foreign standard products. Denote by z^ the type of the marginal
consumer who is between two standards. Using (1), z^ is derived as
z^ =
1
1 + (P =P )
=
1
1 + (n=n)1=( 1)
: (9)
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The equilibrium number of consumers who purchase Foreign standard prod-
ucts, , can be obtained by integrating the density function (3) from 0 to z^
as follows:
 =
Z z^
0
f(z; ")dz =
(1 + ")z^
1 + "z^
=
1
1 + (1 + ") 1(z^ 1   1)
=
1
1 + (1 + ") 1(n=n)1=( 1)
: (10)
Substituting in the equilibrium number of di¤erentiated products, we can
obtain the equilibrium proportion of consumers who purchase Home standard
products:


=

1 + "
t
( 1)=(2 )
: (11)
3 The Impact of Trade Liberalization
In this section we consider the impact of trade liberalization (i.e., a reduction
in t). From (11), we can obtain the equilibrium relationship for the number
of consumers who purchase Foreign standard products:
 = ()  (1 + ")(
)1=( 1)
(1 + ")()1=( 1) + t(1  )1=( 1) : (12)
Figures 2 and 3 help to illustrate the trading equilibrium. Increasing curves
indicate () functions, which show a possible number of consumers who
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purchases Foreign standard products that is consistent with rmsentry/exit
decisions. The trading equilibrium is obtained as the intersection between
these curves and the 45 degree line. According to the shape of () function,
we can obtain the following:
(0) = 0 and (1) = 1:
0() =
(1 + ")t
   1 
[(1  )](2 )=( 1)
[(1 + ")()1=( 1) + t(1  )1=( 1)]2 > 0;
lim
!0
0() =
8><>: 0 if  < 2;1 if  > 2;
lim
!1
0() =
8><>: 0 if  < 2;1 if  > 2:
These results indicate that, depending on the level of elasticity between va-
rieties, , two cases emerge. We shall discuss each case in detail.
3.1 Case 1:  > 2
When  > 2 holds, indirect network e¤ects are relatively mild. Initial trading
equilibrium is obtained as point I in Figure 2. Trade liberalization implies an
increase in the e¤ective number of Foreign varieties n, which makes Foreign
standard products more attractive: this change is shown as an upward shift
of  curve. Since some consumers who had been purchasing Home standard
products switch to Foreign standard products, more Foreign rms enter into
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Home markets. The new equilibrium is obtained as point N on the 45 degree
line.
Proposition 1: Given that  is greater than 2, trade liberalization will in-
duce a relatively small proportion of consumers to purchase Home standard
products.
The point is that there is a cumulative process in which trade liberaliza-
tion will enhance Home consumerspropensity to switch to the Foreign stan-
dard, and this switching will induce further product diversication among
Foreign products. Still, since the indirect network e¤ect is mild, some con-
sumers who prefer Home standard products continue to choose those prod-
ucts.
This result is also quite important from the welfare perspective: since
trade liberalization leads some Home consumers to switchto the Foreign
standard, the market size for Home standard products will shrink and con-
sumers who continue to choose Home standard products are made worse o¤
by trade liberalization.
Proposition 2: Given that  is greater than 2, consumers who continue to
choose Home standard products will be made worse o¤ by trade liberalization.
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3.2 Case 2: 2 >  > 1
When 2 >  > 1 holds, consumersvaluation of product varieties (i.e., the
degree of indirect network e¤ects) is relatively high. In this case, initial trad-
ing equilibrium is obtained as point I in Figure 3. An increase in the e¤ective
number of Foreign varieties has more inuence than in the previous case (i.e.,
an upward shift of the  curve). Then consumersincentives to switch to For-
eign standard products also become greater, which further induces Foreign
rmsentry. Then, the demand for Home standard products vanishes. The
new equilibrium is obtained as point N on the 45 degree line. From Figure
3, one can obtain the surprising feature of the impact of trade liberalization.
Proposition 3: Given that  is smaller than 2, trade liberalization will result
in the situation where no consumer purchases Home standard products.
A comparison between these two cases highlights the important role of
indirect network e¤ects. On one hand, if the indirect network e¤ect is mild,
trade liberalization makes the Foreign standard more attractive to some ex-
tent. Still, some consumers who prefer Home standard products continue to
choose them. On the other hand, if the indirect network e¤ects are su¢ ciently
strong, trade liberalization will make Home standard products completely out
of the Home market.
Before closing this section, it is worthwhile to note that Equation (11)
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implies an interesting result of changes in the distribution of consumers
tastes:
Proposition 4: A shift in consumers tastes towards the Foreign standard
will induce a relatively small share of consumers to purchase Home standard
products.
4 Concluding Remarks
Both trade liberalization and advances in digital technology have driven par-
ticularly intensied competition between incompatible industrial standards.
In this study, we explained the mechanism of how trade liberalization in-
uences consumerschoice of a standard. It should be emphasized that the
degree of substitution between product varieties plays an important role in
determining the impact of trade liberalization: if the degree of substitution
is su¢ ciently small (i.e., the indirect network e¤ect is relatively large), trade
liberalization will make Home standard products completely out of the Home
market.
The present analysis must be regarded as tentative. Hopefully, it pro-
vides a useful paradigm for considering how trade liberalization a¤ects inter-
national competition among industrial standards.
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